Saturday, May 10, 2014

Representation - Who is the other? And who is us?

By Sylvie Shaw


Often in mainstream media reports, there are elements of a divided society where dualistic framing makes for simplistic and easy to follow storylines. Tabloid coverage pits groups against each other when an issue may be far more complex than the surface representation. This could be as straightforward as a division between good versus evil - we are good, the other is chaotic; we are brave, the other is cowardly; we are winners, the others losers. This differentiation is played out in media coverage of events - on and off the sporting field, in local debates over unemployment, poverty, welfare, same sex marriage and who has refugee status. 

Stories are framed in a way that constructions of those WE may disagree with, or are confused about, again underline the US/THEM perspective. This gaze affects body, ethnicity, religion, age and national identity. It creates an ideology about, and a practice towards the other which have personal, political, social, cultural and religious ramifications. For example, studies on representations of Muslims and Islam in the media since 9/11 show an increasing number of stories depicting negative framing (Pappas 2012).

Sociology researcher Christopher Bail (2012) reviewed press releases from community and other groups, even fringe organisations, about issues related to Islam. Common themes in their media releases included the use of emotions such as fear and anger - these garnered the most media attention. In response to this negative media coverage, Muslim groups constructed their return commentary along two main themes - the first were unemotional  condemnations of instances of terrorism (not picked up by the media), while the second were more emotional reactions to discrimination against Muslims and the media tended to cover these perspectives (See also Ogan et al. 2014).

In Queensland religious vilification is against the law under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, along with vilification on the grounds of race, sexuality and gender identity. Under the act, discrimination on the basis of religion includes both a religious belief system and an absence of any religious belief system. This act, and others like it in Australia, are designed to protect those vilified and to promote racial and religious tolerance and harmony among religious groups in society. However, Zimmerman (2013:459) argues that often the reverse may occur:

'Aiming at promoting “cultural diversity,” these laws have become a permanent vehicle for religious extremists to silence the debate by allowing them to claim that they, rather than their beliefs, have been attacked'. He sets out to show that 'there might exist under the Australian Constitution an implied right of freedom of speech...'.

Zimmerman's article focuses on cases in Victoria around religious vilification. I won't be discussing the case studies here, but based on his observation and analysis of certain cases, and in the context of Australia's identity as a multicultural and multifaith nation, he suggests there is a danger that religious vilification laws in Australia may not promote the sense of cultural diversity and harmony they aim to achieve. He argues strongly that:

'Because of its postmodern underpinnings, religious vilification laws, such as the RRTA (the Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act), seem to uphold the rather incredible premise of moral equivalence between all religions, so that no religious ideas or practices deserve to be strongly criticized and/or repudiated.' 

Is such a moral equivalence between all religions wrong or problematic? Zimmerman seems to think so, outlining that all religions and religious institutions have different value systems and, as a result, 'produce rather different kinds of society'. What he suggests is that relativism, universalism and essentialism may impinge too much when differing values and belief systems are played out in a legal context.

In supporting his stance, he cites the different views held by religious adherents and institutions on a range of contentious and potentially divisive issues. These issues include such significant ethical topics as slavery, capital punishment, abortion, and euthanasia. More broadly, religious perspectives may reflect or influence social values, or are reflected or influenced by political systems in different cultures, legal systems including approaches to war (citing Durie 2005).

The issue I have with Zimmerman is that he concludes by promoting the issue of free speech - and thus the freedom to express (or promote) hate speech. But hate speech can affect an individual or social/religious/cultural/political group  negatively, emotionally psychologically, and spiritually. To highlight the damaging ramifications of hate speech and negative representations of the other (or THEM), Letts (2002: 354) likens these effects to experiences of trauma:

'In general, the overall short- and long-term effects suggest that the consequences of hate speech might be similar in form (but sometimes not in intensity) to the effects experienced by recipients of other kinds of traumatic experiences'.

Religious vilification laws may not be able to prevent hate speech but it can assist those suffering traumatic experiences by showing that Australian society maintains such actions are unlawful. However, not all potential cases of discrimination are deemed unlawful. This occurs as anti-discrimination legislation provides certain exemptions for religious organisations which enables them to affirm their religious identity and values (which in non-exemptive situations may be deemed discimination).

'Religious institutions controlled or run by a body established for religious purposes (e.g. a catholic seminary, Jewish rabbinical school, or Buddhist monastery) may discriminate on the basis of any protected characteristic when employing people, provided that discrimination is necessary to conform with religious beliefs or sensitivities. This covers schools run by religious bodies' (ASA 2014).

Not all religious organisations support the presence and intention of anti-discrimination exemptions. For instance, the Australian Sangha Association opposes the practice saying it conflicts with Buddhist principles: 'Religious organizations are perpetuating divisions and suspicion, when they should be leading the way in creating a fairer, more loving and compassionate community' (ASA 2014).

Another legal case that centres on religious values and legal exemptions took place recently in Victoria. The Victorian Court of Appeal upheld an earlier case that a youth group associated with gay issues had been discriminated against. 

The case began in 2007 when a Victorian rural health centre involved with issues of youth suicide amongst gay youth was refused accommodation at a Christian campsite. The case was originally taken to the Victorian Civil and Administration Tribunal (VCAT) by the health group. VCAT found that discrimination had occurred on the grounds of sexual orientation. Almost seven years later the Court of Appeal upheld VCAT's original decision - that the Christian group had discriminated by refusing to allow same-sex attracted young people to stay at the camp.

The Victorian Equal Opportunity Act allows religious groups to discriminate if the discrimination is made on the grounds 'genuine religious beliefs or principles' (Russell 2014). But in this case, such religious exemptions were not deemed to apply.

Critics of the court's decision perceive that religious exemptions
have been 'watered down' - a move seen to 'restrict the ability of religious organisations to operate within their own faiths'
(Towers 2014), and to prevent the freedom to practise religion. According to the Christian organisation Freedom 4 Faith (2014):

'Religious freedom has long been an integral part of Australian life, recognised by the common law. However, freedoms that were once taken for granted in Australia can be taken for granted no longer. There are also issues about potential conflicts between freedom of religion and other valid principles of modern society such as freedom from improper discrimination'.

In contrast, the Victorian Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby (VGLRL) supports extended restrictions on religious exemptions 'to allow greater freedom from discrimination for LGBTI people, and greater transparency in how these exemptions are applied' (Cook 2014). 

Representations are constructed in multiple and situated ways. Divisions of US and THEM are continually in flux; values and behaviours may shift according to religious, political, social, cultural and mediated positionings. For religion, these positions are heightened when certain religious adherents or groups 'cannot tolerate the existence of those who have different views or beliefs...and refuse to accept any way of understanding the religion other than their own way of understanding' (Hamid in Glazov 2010). Further, according to Satter (in Glazov): 'A religion becomes an ideology when its man-made elements become an idée fixe and are seized upon as an idea that can be imposed on all political and social institutions in the interests of power.'

To counter the extremes of these ideological impositions and idées fixes, Karen Armstrong, and her initiative The Charter of Compassion, calls for US to 'always treat all others as we wish to be treated ourselves. Compassion compels us to work tirelessly to alleviate the suffering of our fellow creatures...and to honour the inviolable sanctity of every single human being, treating everybody without exception, with absolute justice, equity and respect'.


References cited
- ASA [Australian Sangha Association]. 2014. Anti- discrimination exemptions for religious organizations. http://australiansangha.org/australiansangha/policies/anti-discrimination-exemptions-for-religious-organizations/ 
- Bail C.A. 2012. The fringe effect: civil society organizations and the evolution of media discourse about Islam. American Sociological Review, 77(7).
- Clazov J. 2010. Symposium: When Does a Religion Become an Ideology? Frontpagemag, June 4, http://www.frontpagemag.com/2010/jamie-glazov/symposium-when-does-a-religion-become-an-ideology/ 
- Cook R. 2014. LGBTI youth win discrimination case against Christian group. GNN (Gay News Network), April 16, 2014, http://gaynewsnetwork.com.au/
- Durie M. 2005. Notes on the Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act (2001), address at the Seminar on Religious Tolerance Laws of the Christian Legal Society of Victoria, June 2, 2005.
- Freedom 4 Faith. 2014. National agenda for religious freedom, http://www.freedom4faith.org.au/reading.aspx
- Leets L. 2002. Experiencing hate speech: perceptions andresponses to anti-Semitism and antigay speech. Journal of Social Issues, 58(2): 341-361.
- Ogan C, L. Wilnat, R. Pennington, M. Bashir. 2014. The rise of anti-Muslim prejudice. Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States. International Communication Gazette 76(1): 27-46.
- Pappas S. 2012. Negative portrayals of Muslims get more media attention. LiveScience, November 29, 2012. 
- Russell M. 2014. Christian Brethren-owned camp discriminated against gays: court. The Age, April 16, 2014.
-Towers K. 2014. New anti-discrimination laws ‘erode religious freedom’, The Australian, May 9, 2014.
- Zimmerman A. 2013. The unconstitutionality of religious vilification laws in Australia: why religious vilification laws are contrary to the implied freedom of political communication affirmed in the Australian Constitution. BYU Law Review 3(4): 457-504, http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2013/iss3/4.


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